

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01181 01 OF 03 231932Z

44

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ARAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 OFA-01 DOTE-00 COME-00 OES-03

DLOS-04 TRSE-00 OMB-01 INT-05 /064 W  
----- 038995

O R 231732Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6974

INFO COMDT COGARD WASHDC

COGDSEVEN MIAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 NASSAU 1181

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EFIS, BF

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER ON SPINY LOBSTER

REF: STATE 165031

1. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET THIS MORNING WITH PRIMIN PINDLING  
ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT.

2. THE PRIMIN BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE REGRETTEED THAT A  
CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME HAD PASSED SINCE OUR EARLIER  
DISCUSSION (OF JULY 3) BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAD HAD SEVERAL  
RATHER LENGTHY MEETINGS ON THE MATTER.

3. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS AT THIS TIME PREPARED  
TO SUGGEST THAT THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND I  
CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TO SEE WHETHER  
A BASIS EXISTED FOR CONDUCTING DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS LEADING  
TO AN AGREEMENT. THE PRIMIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WERE  
AT LEAST A FEW PRELIMINARY MATTERS ON WHICH THEY WISHED  
CLARIFICATION AS TO THE U. S. POSITION. HE NOTED THAT  
HE HAD BEEN READING VARIOUS ACCOUNTS OF WHAT THE U. S.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01181 01 OF 03 231932Z

POSITION WAS AND WANTED TO GET OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION.

MORE SPECIFICALLY, HE STATED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CLARIFY WHETHER IN FACT THE USG ACCEPTED THE VALIDITY OF THE BAHAMIAN CONTINENTAL SHELF LEGISLATION. HE SAID FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW THIS WAS A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TOWARD A BILATERAL AGREEMENT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WERE OTHER MATTERS WHICH ALSO REQUIRED CLARIFICATION, NOTING IN PASSING THE PROBLEM WHICH THE GCOB SAW IN AGREEING TO ACCORD CUBAN PAROLEES OPERATING OUT OF FLORIDA THE RIGHT TO FISH IN BAHAMIAN WATERS. (IN A LATER PART OF THE CONVERSATION, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE NOT LICENSED BY THE U. S. TO FISH IN FLORIDA WATERS AND HE DID NOT SEE HOW THE BAHAMAS COULD BE ASKED UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES TO PERMIT THESE SAME CUBANS TO FISH IN BAHAMIAN WATERS.) FINALLY HE SAID HE WAS CONCERNED BY WHAT WE DO IN THE INTERIM PENDING THE CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSIONS. HE REFERRED TO THE VARIOUS NEWSPAPER AND RADIO REPORTS OF CUBANS IN MIAMI THREATENING TO ARM THEIR VESSELS IN ANTICIPATION OF CONFRONTATION. HE ASKED FOR MY REACTIONS.

4. I STARTED BY SAYING THAT WHATEVER HE HAD HEARD FROM UNOFFICIAL SOURCES I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT THE U. S. DID NOT HAVE A FIRM AND FINAL POSITION. I SAID WE HAD OBVIOUSLY STUDIED THE MATTER AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH AND WOULD BE PREPARED IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS TO EXPLAIN OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THE VARIOUS SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT MIGHT BE RAISED. HOWEVER, IN SOME RESPECTS IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF BAHAMIAN THINKING BEFORE FINAL POSITIONS COULD BE ADVANCED.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF BAHAMIAN CONTINENTAL SHELF LEGISLATION, I SAID THAT I WOULD URGENTLY SEEK TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A DEFINITIVE ANSWER. I SAID THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY I DID NOT KNOW OF ANY BASIC ISSUE WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE BAHAMIAN LAW, BUT THAT IF THERE REMAINED UNCERTAINTY ON THIS SCORE IN THE MIND OF THE GCOB, AS THERE OBVIOUSLY DID, I WOULD SEEK TO SECURE FORMAL CLARIFICATION OF THIS POINT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01181 01 OF 03 231932Z

YM WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF HOW CUBAN PAROLEES WERE HANDLED UNDER A BILATERAL AGREEMENT I SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER BETTER LEFT FOR THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. (THE PRIMIN READILY AGREED.) I OFFERED, HOWEVER, A PERSONAL COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT MY ASSUMPTION WAS THAT AN AGREEMENT SUCH AS WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING WOULD COVER INDIVIDUALS OPERATING UNDER U. S. FLAG, WHATEVER THEIR

NATIONALITY. I SAID IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE FISHING INDUSTRY IN FLORIDA LARGELY DEPENDED UPON A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CUBANS WHO MANNED AMERICAN FLAG VESSELS OWNED BY U. S. FISHING COMPANIES AND, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, I WOULD PRESUME THAT THEY OUGHT TO BE COVERED IN THE AGREEMENT.

7. I THEN TURNED TO THE PRIMIN'S LAST POINT DEALING WITH THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ARISE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. I SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER WHICH HAD WORRIED ME FROM THE OUTSET. I STATED THAT WHEN WE HAD FIRST APPROACHED THE GCOB LAST DECEMBER I HAD FELT THAT THERE WAS MORE THAN AMPLE TIME FOR US TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS AND REACH AN AGREEMENT WELL BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE NEW FISHING SEASON. FOR REASONS BETTER UNDERSTOOD BY THE PRIMIN, THIS HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE AND WE NOW FACED THE PROSPECT THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT LIKELY BEFORE THE ONSET OF THE NEW SEASON. ACCORDINGLY, I HAD EARLIER URGED AND I WISHED TO RENEW THE APPEAL FOR THE GCOB TO DECLARE A MORATORIUM ON ENFORCEMENT. I SAID THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A MORATORIUM THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE COAST GUARD WOULD ISSUE A WARNING FOR FLORIDA FISHERMEN TO STAY OFF THE BAHAMIAN BANKS. MOREOVER, I WAS AWARE THAT THE GCOB HAD INDICATED ITS INTENTION TO EXERCISE DISCRETION IN THE INITIAL PHASES OF ENFORCEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THESE EFFORTS BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS, THERE WAS NO WAY OF ASSURING THAT THE 600-PLUS FISHERMEN COULD ALL BE KEPT IN CHECK. THERE HAD BEEN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PAST WHEN SHOOTINGS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT WAS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT A REINSTITUTION OF SUCH ACTION COULD BE AVOIDED IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. NEVERTHELESS THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE OF THAT AND SHOULD IT OCCUR THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE TRAGICALLY UNFORTUNATE. I SAW  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NASSAU 01181 01 OF 03 231932Z

THREE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES. THE FIRST WAS THAT SOMEONE MIGHT BE HURT, EVEN CONCEIVABLY KILLED. THIS WAS A HUMAN TRAGEDY WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD AN OBLIGATION TO PRECLUDE. SECONDLY, IF SUCH A TRAGEDY OCCURRED, IT COULD NOT HELP BY ADVERSELY INFLUENCE THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. EVEN THOUGH THE U. S. WOULD ENTER THESE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BELIEF THAT A MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS WAS POSSIBLE GIVEN THE GOODWILL WHICH EXISTED ON BOTH SIDES AND I WAS SURE THAT THE GCOB WOULD APPROACH THE DISCUSSIONS IN A LIKE FRAME OF MIND, TRAGEDY SUCH AS I HAD DESCRIBED WOULD INFLAME EMOTIONS AND CREATE POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR NEGOTIATION BOTH SIDES. THIRD AND FINALLY, I NOTED THAT THERE COULD BE AN IMPLICATION NOT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE FISHING PROBLEM PER SE. I NOTED THAT SELDOM DOES A WEEK GO BY WHEN I AM NOT

QUERIED BY ONE AMERICAN INTEREST OR ANOTHER DEALING EITHER  
IN TOURISM OR IN PROSPECTIVE INVESTMENTS IN THE BAHAMAS  
INQUIRING AS TO THE STABILITY OF THE LOCAL  
POLITICAL SCENE. I SAID THAT IT WAS PERFECTLY EASY FOR ME  
TO ANSWER SUCH QUERIES BY SAYING THAT THIS GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01181 02 OF 03 232019Z

63

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ARAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 OFA-01 DOTE-00 OES-03 DLOS-04

TRSE-00 OMB-01 INT-05 /064 W  
----- 039577

O R 231732Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6975

INFO COMDT COGARD WASHDC

COGDSEVEN MIAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 NASSAU 1181

WAS BOTH FRIENDLY TO THE US AND HIGHLY STABLE POLITICALLY.  
HOWEVER, IF A SHOOTING TRAGEDY OF THE SORT I  
DESCRIBED WERE TO OCCUR, EVEN THOUGH THIS WERE NOT INTENDED  
BY EITHER GOVERNMENT AND EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD NOT  
FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE MY ASSESSMENT TOWARD THE US, INEVITABLY  
SUCH A TRAGEDY WOULD BE GIVEN WIDE PUBLICITY. ONCE  
THIS OCCURRED, NO AMOUNT OF REASSURANCE ON MY PART COULD  
OFFSET THE DOUBTS WHICH WOULD BE ENGENDERED IN THE MINDS  
OF AMERICANS INVOLVED IN TOURISM OR IS PROSPECTIVE  
INVESTMENT IN THE BAHAMAS. I SAID THAT IN CITING THESE  
VARIOUS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES I HOPED THE PRIMIN BELIEVED  
THAT I WAS SPEAKING AS A FRIEND OF THE BAHAMAS AND THUS  
WHEN I PROPOSED THE INITIATION OF A MORATORIUM I DID SO  
NOT SOLELY BECAUSE I THOUGHT THIS WAS GOOD FOR THE US,  
BUT BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH BAHAMIAN  
INTERESTS AS WELL.

8. THE PRIMIN ACKNOWLEDGED THE VALIDITY OF THE POINTS I HAD MADE. HE HAD EARLIER SPECIFICALLY ADMITTED THAT DESPITE BEST EFFORTS IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ASSURE AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL TAKING THE LAW INTO HIS OWN HANDS. NEVERTHELESS, HE STATED THAT HE WASN'T SURE HOW THEY COULD GO  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01181 02 OF 03 232019Z

ABOUT IMPLEMENTING A MORATORIUM. THE PRIMIN SAID HE SUPPOSED THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO TAKE THE LAW OFF THE BOOKS. I SAID OF COURSE I DID NOT KNOW HOW THEIR SYSTEM WOULD HANDLE SUCH A MATTER, BUT THAT IN OUR OWN CASE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH AN ANALOGOUS PROPOSAL FROM THE CANADIANS TO HOLD OFF ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF OUR CONTINENTAL SHELF LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO THE MAINE LOBSTER, PENDING THE COMPLETION OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, WE HAD AGREED TO DO SO AND SO DIRECTED OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES. I SAID THAT I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT IF THE MARINE POLICE WERE INSTRUCTED IN A SIMILAR VEIN SUCH A MORATORIUM COULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

9. THE PRIMIN SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS TO BE A MEETING WITH THE FLORIDA FISHERMEN SOMETIME THIS WEEK. I SAID THAT THERE WAS AND THAT DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLINGAN WAS TRAVELLING FROM THE DEPARTMENT SPECIFICALLY FOR THAT PURPOSE. I POINTED OUT THAT MR. CLINGAN WAS AN EXPERT IN SUCH MATTERS AND WOULD, ONCE OUR EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS WERE OUT OF THE WAY, COME TO NASSAU FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURSUING THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE JOINING MR. CLINGAN IN MIAMI FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FISHERMEN AND NOTED THAT I HAD BEEN CALLED BY MAYOR FERRE FROM MIAMI, WHO ALSO EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS. I SAID THAT THE ATTITUDE WHICH ALL OF THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WOULD BRING TO THOSE DISCUSSIONS WAS ONE DESIGNED TO COOL MATTERS OFF. I SAID THAT IN THIS REGARD IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO REPORT THAT, HAVING AGREED TO CONDUCT AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS HAD DECLARED A MORATORIUM ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR LAW THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A HIGHLY POSITIVE EFFECT. THE PRIMIN COMMENTED AGAIN ON THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY THAT HE SAW IN TAKING SUCH AN ACTION. I SAID THAT IF IT WOULD EASE THE POLITICAL SITUATION CREATED BY DECLARING A MORATORIUM OF INDEFINITE DURATION, PERHAPS A LIMITED MORATORIUM WOULD MEET THE INITIAL NEED. I NOTED THAT I WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO OFFICIALLY ADVANCE SUCH A PROPOSAL BUT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE GCOB COULD MAKE A PERSUASIVE CASE WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE THAT HAVING AGREED TO ENTER INTO  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01181 02 OF 03 232019Z

DISCUSSIONS A LIMITED MORATORIUM WAS IN EFFECT PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS, PERHAPS A ONE MONTH MORATORIUM. I SAID THAT, ARMED WITH THIS AGREEMENT, I WOULD PERSONALLY BE PREPARED TO PREDICT TO THE FISHERMEN THAT AN EVENTUAL BILATERAL AGREEMENT WHICH MET THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND THAT THIS WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS CALMING EFFECT. (THE PRIMIN SMILED BROADLY AND INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT "YOU WOULD HAVE TO BE A VERY BRAVE MAN TO OFFER SUCH AN ASSURANCE." THIS MAY HAVE BEEN SIMPLY A JOULAR REFERENCE SINCE IT WAS SAID IN A CHIDING TONE. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, I HAD THE UNAEASY FEELING THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION THAT, THOUGH THE PRIMIN WAS PERSONALLY RECEPTIVE TO THE ARGUMENTS I HAD MADE AND INDEED PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT EQUITABLE AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET MAY WELL HAVE EXPRESSED MUCH GRAVER RESERVATIONS WHICH HE WOULD SOMEHOW EVENTUALLY HAVE TO OVERRIDE.)

10. THE PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE COMMENTS THAT I HAD MADE. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN THE MEANTIME I CONTACT MINEXTAFF ADERLEY TO BEGIN THE PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED. HE SAID FINALLY HE WOULD IN PARTICULAR GIVE FURTHER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM.

11. COMMENT: A) THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR US TO GET OUT OF THE WAY ONCE AND FOR ALL IS THE MATTER OF US ACCEPTANCE OF THE BAHAMIAN CONTINENTAL SHELF LEGISLATION. BASED ON MY DISCUSSIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT A FEW WEEKS AGO, IT WAS MADE EXPLICITLY CLEAR TO ME THAT NO REPEAT NO ELEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT HAD ANY QUESTION ABOUT THE PROPRIETY OF THE GCOB LEGISLATION WHICH IS PRACTICALLY WORD FOR WORD A COPY OF COPARABLE USG LEGISLATION. DESPITE THIS FACT AND CONTRARY TO MEY RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE TIME, I WAS ASKED TO HOLD OFF GIVING AN EXPLICIT ASSURANCE TO THE GCOB TO THIS EFFECT ON THE GROUNDS THAT HOLDING OFF MIGHT PROVIDE SOME "LEVERAGE". I ACQUIESCED IN THIS POSITION. WHATEVER THE LOGIC OF OUR HAVING DELAYED AN EXPLICIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NASSAU 01181 02 OF 03 232019Z

VALIDITY OF THE BAHAMIAN LEGISLATION, THE TIME HAS CLEARLY COME WHEN I SHOULD MAKE A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT. I REQUEST URGENT AUTHORIZATION

TO DO SO. I BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST INITIALLY (AND PERHAPS  
IN TOTO) AN ORAL CONFIRMATION IS TALL THAT IS REQUIRED.  
SPECIFICALLY, IF I COULD SAY THAT THE USG CONFIRMS THAT  
IT RECOGNIZES THE BAHAMIAN CONTINENTAL SHELF LEGISLATION  
AS IT PERTAINS TO THE LOBSTERS AS BEING ESSENTIALLY  
BASED O N COMPARABLE US LEGISLATION  
AND INTENDS TO INFORM US CITIZENS THAT THEY MUST  
RESPECT THIS NEW BAHAMIAN LAW (WHICH IS WHAT UNIDENTIFIED  
STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKEMAN HAS SAID AND WHAT OUR PORPOSED  
COAST GUARD NOTICE IS AUTHORIZED TO SAY) WE WOULD HAVE PUT  
THIS TO RSEST.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01181 03 OF 03 232038Z

63

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ARAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 OFA-01 DOTE-00 OES-03 DLOS-04

TRSE-00 OMB-01 INT-05 /064 W  
----- 039846

O R 231732Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6976

INFO COMDT COGARD WASHDC

COGDSEVEN MIAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 NASSAU 1181

B) ONCE HAVING MADE THE STATEMENT IN (A) ABOVE, I  
THINK WE WILL HAVE OVERCOME THE MOST IMMEDIATE POLITICAL  
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPEDIMENT TO AN EVENTUAL SUCCESSFUL  
NEGOTIATION. BUT IT IS CLEAR, AS IT HAS BEEN FROM THE  
OUTSET, THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A PROBLEM WHICH IS  
COMPLICATED, NOT SOLELY BY THE NEED TO WORK OUT SPECIFIC  
MODALITIES WHICH MIGHT REASONABLY MEET U. S. AND GCOB LEGITIMATE  
INTERESTS, BUT BY A VARIETY OF OTHER FACTORS AS WELL: UNCERTAINTY  
ON THE PART OF BAHAMIANS, EVEN A DEGREE OF INFERIORITY  
AS REGARDS THEIR ABILITY TO PREPARE A DETAILED POSITION  
FOR ENGAGING US IN TALKS; A DIFFICULT POLITICAL POSITION

GIVEN THE STRONG BAHAMIAN FEELING ABOUT AND PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN ONE OF THEIR "VERY FEW RESOURCES"; A DEEP CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT TO "THE GOOD OLD DAYS" WHEN BAHAMIANS FISHED "GRANDDADDY LOBSTERS"; A GENUINE FEAR THAT U. S. FISHERMEN WILL TOTALLY DESTROY THE LOBSTER RESOURCE AS (IT IS POPULARLY BELIEVED HERE) HAPPENED OFF FLORIDA. ON TOP OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT UNDOUBTEDLY SEES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MAKING DOMESTIC POLITICAL HAY BY BEING TOUGH WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PERHAPS FEARING THAT A FAILURE ON ITS PART TO STRIKE THIS POSTURE WOULD PERMIT THE OPPOSITION TO STEAL A MARCH. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01181 03 OF 03 232038Z

IN THIS CONNECTION, ONE OF THE FEW ISSUES ON WHICH ALL BAHAMIAN PARTIES ARE UNITED IS CONTROL OVER THE LOBSTERS.

C) STEMMING FROM (B) ABOVE, THERE ARE TWO PRINCIPLES WHICH I URGE THAT WE ADOPT AS PART OF OUR TACTICS IN PURSUING THIS ISSUE. THE FIRST IS THAT WE PLACE OUR EMPHASIS ON GETTING THE BAHAMIANS ENGAGED INCREMENTALLY. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE HAD IN MIND IN ANY EVENT, BUT IT WAS UNDERLINED BY THE HIGHLY TENTATIVE APPROACH WHICH THE PRIMIN OUTLINED TO ME TODAY. THEIR FIRST EFFORT WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD EXPLORING WHETHER A BASIS EXISTS FOR DETAILED NEGOTIATION. I THINK IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO CONVINCE THEM. IN ANY EVENT, I HAVE ALREADY PLACED A CALL TO ADDERLEY CONSISTENT BOTH WITH MY EARLIER INSTRUCTIONS AND AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE PRIMIN'S INVITATION TO DO SO, AND I AM SEEING HIM THURSDAY MORNING, JULY 24. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE THE EXPERTS WHICH WERE REFERRED TO IN REFTEL AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. THE SECOND PRINCIPLE WHICH WE SHOULD ADOPT IS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WILL HAVE TO DO A GOOD DEAL OF LEADING IN THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE INITIAL EXCHANGE WITH ADDERLEY, I WOULD EXPECT PRIMARILY TO DRAW HIM OUT A BIT MORE ON WHAT SORTS OF PROBLEMS OR QUESTIONS THE GCOB HAS. WE MIGHT ALSO HOPEFULLY OBTAIN A LITTLE BIT MORE THINKING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES WHICH THE PRIMIN IDENTIFIED TO ME IN OUR JULY 3 CONVERSATION. ASSUMING THAT WE PROCEED FROM THAT INTO THE FULL BLOWN NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WILL REQUIRE TOM CLINGAN, I URGE THAT WE HAVE AS MUCH IN THE WAY OF A "POSITION" AS WE POSSIBLY CAN. GIVEN THE WAY THE GCOB OPERATES THERE IS NO REPEAT NO POSSIBILITY THAT WE CAN EXPECT THEM TO DO MUCH MORE THAN INDICATE A GENERAL DIRECTION OF THINKING. WHAT WE WILL HAVE TO DO IS TO TAKE THAT THINKING AND TURN IT INTO A DETAILED PROPOSAL WHICH WE THINK PROTECTS OUR INTERESTS WHILE TAKING DUE ACCORD OF GCOB CONCERNS. IN EVERY RECENT CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD ON THE SPINY LOBSTER SUBJECT, IT HAS BEEN



CLEAR THAT THE GCOB EXPECTS THE U. S. TO HAVE A  
"POSITION" BY WHICH THEY MEAN THAT WE TELL THEM WHAT  
IT IS WE THINK IS A REASONABLE PROPOSAL SO THAT THEY  
CAN REACT TO IT. I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS SLIGHTLY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01181 03 OF 03 232038Z

BACKWARD FROM WHAT IT SHOULD BE, BUT I CONFIDENTLY  
PREDICT THAT UNLESS WE DO HAVE A POSITION TO ADVANCE,  
HOPEFULLY IN SOME DETAIL, OR SEVERAL OPTIONS ON ACCEPT-  
ABLE ARRANGEMENTS, ANY ONE OF WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE  
TO US, THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROCEED VERY SLOWLY INDEED.

D) SINCE, UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, WE  
CANNOT TELL HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE BEFORE WE CAN REACH  
AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE GCOB I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL  
FOR US TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO PRESS FOR THE MORATORIUM.  
IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, WE MAY BE UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THIS  
JUST MAY BE TOO MUCH FOR THIS STILL NEW NATION TO MANAGE  
FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. (AS CAN BE SEEN FROM MY  
CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIMIN, HE IS NOT EVEN SURE HOW THE  
MECHANICS COULD BE HANDLED.) PERSONALLY, I WOULD BE MORE  
THAN DELIGHTED TO SETTLE FOR A GCOB AGREEMENT TO A  
TEMPORARY, E. G. ONE MONTH MORATORIUM, AS I ADVANCED TO  
THE PRIMIN AS BEING A PERSONAL SUGGESTION. IF WE ONCE  
GET THEM HOOKED INTO A ONE MONTH MORATORIUM WHILE THE  
TALKS ARE BEGUN, I WOULD THINK THAT THE CHANCES WOULD  
BE VERY GOOD THAT THE MORATORIUM COULD BE EXTENDED IF THAT  
SHOULD PROVE NECESSARY. IN THIS CONNECTION THE SEMIANNUAL  
EXTENSION OF OUR TARGET DATE FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON  
MILITARY FACILITIES RIGHTS IS AN INDICATION BOTH AS TO  
HOW SLOW THIS GOVERNMENT OPERATES AND AS TO HOW READILY  
IT FINDS IT POSSIBLE TO GO ALONG WITH THE STATUS QUO ONCE  
HAVING MADE THE INITIAL DECISION TO DO SO.

12. YOUR URGENT RESPONSE IS SOLICITED, BUT ESPECIALLY  
WITH REGARD TO POINT (A) PARA 11.  
WEISS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SHELLFISH, REFUGEES, NEGOTIATIONS, FISHING AGREEMENTS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 23 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NASSAU01181  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750254-0774  
**From:** NASSAU  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750729/aaaabaii.tel  
**Line Count:** 480  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ARA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 STATE 165031  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 SEP 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 SEP 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <04 SEP 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER ON SPINY LOBSTER  
**TAGS:** EFIS, BF  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006